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May I say how delighted I am at this opportunity of talking to you today about the 
perspective  of  a  Strasbourg  judge  on  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the 
European Union.
1 It goes without saying that the views I here express are not to be 
attributed to the Court itself; yet they may be taken as reflecting, in a general sense, 
what I regard to be the Strasbourg approach. 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was adopted some sixty 
years ago, did more than just declare rights in the abstract, as other human right s 
instruments had previously done. It was not meant to be a mere guide, indicating to 
member  states  what  they  should ideally  be  aiming  at. It  singled  out  the  most 
important  civil  and  political  rights  and  freedoms,  which  had  repeatedly  been 
proclaimed as universal, and gave them a tangible, present significance. They were 
imperatively to be respected. So they were made the subject of ultimate collective 
responsibility. A control mechanism, based on the principle of subsidiarity, was set up 
and reformed over the years. Today it consists of the permanent European Court of 
Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court), complemented by the Committee of Ministers 
as the body which supervises enforcement.
2 
In parallel with the very task-specific Strasbourg system of human rights protection, 
there arose in the development of Western Europe after the Second World War 
another important strand, leading indirectly and gradually to a climate conducive to 
such protection. I refer of course to the emergence of a new system of economi c 
cooperation, that of the European Economic Community which aspired, as it grew 
and prospered, to embrace and to incorporate within its essential economic aims 
both social cohesion and at least some measure of common political governance.
3 It 
soon became obvious that in fact the economic activities of the Community required 
a framework of fundamental rights in which to flourish. Thus it was that the European 
                                                            
*  Judge of the European Court of Human Rights. 
1  In  the  context  of  a  Symposium  on  “Fundamental  Rights  in  the  EU  three  years  after  Lisbon” 
organised by the Presidency of the Council in cooperation with the College of Europe, held on 16 
November 2012. 
2  The Court has over the years devised methods of making its judgments more effective by,  inter alia, 
facilitating their enforcement: see “The New Perspective of the European Court of Human Rights on 
the Effectiveness of its Judgments”, HRLJ, Vol. 31, 2011, p. 269. 
3  It began with the Treaty of Paris signed in 1951 by six States which set up the European Coal and 
Steel Community, followed in 1958 by the two Treaties of Rome, one creating Euratom and the other 
the EEC which, enlarged and transformed through a series of Treaties that culminated in the 2009 
Treaty of Lisbon, has become the present European Union. For an overview see Allan Rosas’ “The 
European Union: In search of legitimacy”, in Vinodh Jaichand and Markku Suksi (eds.), 60 Years of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Europe, Intersentia, 2009. Court of Justice (ECJ),
4 beginning in 1969 with  Stauder, introduced and gradually 
built,  through  its  case-law,  a  range  of  fundamental  rights,  constituting  what  were 
termed “general principles of law”.
5 In this process it derived inspiration and drew 
freely  from  a  number  of  sources:  from  the  common  constitutional  traditions  of 
member states and from international instruments relevant to the matter, the most 
important of all being the ECHR to which the ECJ attached special significance.
6 In 
this process the aim was to ensure legality in the Community legal order, whether 
such legality related to Community action or to the application of Community law by 
member States. Although the ECHR provided an invaluable point of reference, there 
was no comprehensive and easily accessible list emanating from the Community 
itself. The  Charter  of Fundamental  Rights  has  no w  filled  that gap. It  was first 
proclaimed on 9 and 10 December 2000 at Nice and adopted by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
7 It was amended and readopted on 12 
December 2007 at Strasbourg.
8  It comprised, if I may put it shortly, of   existing 
general principles of law, including those set out in the ECHR and the relevant 
Strasbourg case-law, re-defining some and according them a broader scope. Now, 
under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter has become part of EU primary law.
9 An 
explanatory memorandum accompanying the Charter provides general guidance. It is 
expected that all this will make for greater uniformity in the application of EU law. 
Within the EU the Charter had, for certain purposes, an almost immediate impact 
even though it had no legally binding effect. Legislation that was introduced made 
reference  to  it;  Advocates -General  relied  on  it  in  support  of  arguments  and 
propositions; gradually judicial use was made of it as well, initially by the Court of 
First Instance
10  which referred to the Charter as a new source of general legal 
                                                            
4  Renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
5  Fundamental  rights  were  not  mentioned  in  the  original  Treaties  and  the  ECJ  was  at  first 
unsympathetic to including them in its case -law but then, in the context of its remarkable judicial 
activism, it gradually introduced them into the system as a matter of expediency in view of the 
refusal of the German Constitutional Court to otherwise accept the pri macy of Community Law; 
through  a  line  of  cases,  Stauder,  (Judgment  of  12  November  1969,  Case  29/69,  ECR  419), 
Internationale Handelsgesellshaft (Judgment of 17 December 1970, Case 11/70, ECR 1125), Nold 
(Judgment of 14 May 1974, Case 4/73, ECR 491), and Rutili (Judgment of 28 October 1975, Case 
36/75, ECR 1219) the ECJ lay increasingly emphasis on fundamental rights and, as from 1975, on 
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  For  a  summary  of  these  developments  see  “The 
European Union and Fundamental Rights/Human rights” by Allan Rosas, in Catarina Krause and 
Martin Scheinin (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, 2009. 
6  See supra at note 5. 
7  OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p.1.14.12.207, C303/1. 
8  OJ C 303, 14 12 2007; and see also OJ C 83, 30.3 2010. 
9  Article 6(1) TEU as adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon accords the Charter the same value as that of a 
Treaty. The Charter itself provides in Article 51(1) that it is “addressed to the institutions and bodies 
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when 
they are implementing Union law.” As to generally the applicability of the Charter see A fresh Start 
for the Charter: Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights by Thomas von Danwitz and Katherina Paraschas. 
10  Renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon as the General Court. principles, thus placing it more or less on a par with the ECHR; and subsequently, in 
2006, by the ECJ with whose judgment in the case of Parliament v. Council
11 the 
Charter, as it then stood, reached a high-water mark.
12 From the Strasbourg point of 
view  the  Charter,  as  an  “international  text”,  exerted  an  influence  right  from  the 
beginning, though its present treaty rank has certainly added to that.
13 
The case in which the Strasbourg Court first referred to  the Charter and derived 
support from it was that of Christine Goodwin v. the UK.
14 The applicant complained, 
inter alia, that the United Kingdom authorities had failed in their positive obligations 
concerning  her  right  to  respect  for  private  life  and  the  right  to  marry  under, 
respectively, Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention. The complaints arose because the 
domestic law did not allow alterations to be made to the register of births subsequent 
to the initial entry, which meant that the register could not reflect gender change, thus 
placing the applicant, who had undergone gender re-assignment, at a disadvantage. 
The Court spoke of the stress, the vulnerability, the alienation and the humiliation that 
resulted from the conflict between the new reality, in respect of the applicant, and the 
law which refused to recognize that reality. What is interesting and germane to the 
present purpose was that the Court had examined essentially the same problem in 
three earlier United Kingdom cases, one of them quite recently - Rees v. the UK,
15  
Cossey v. the UK,
16 X., Y. and Z. v. the UK,
17 and Sheffield and Horsham v. the UK
18 
- and had not found a violation. So what was it that turned the scales? In Christine 
Goodwin  the  Court  inquired  again  as  to  whether  there  was  “any  evolving 
convergence as to the standards to be achieved” but did not discern any evidence of 
that in Europe. However, it attached more importance to an uncontested continuing 
international trend in favour of legal recognition of gender re-assignment and, in that 
regard,  it  included  in  its  comments  the  liberal  view  taken  in  Australia  and  New 
Zealand. Further, it observed that there were, in the domestic debate on the matter, 
                                                            
11  Judgment of 27 June 2006, C-540/03, ECR I-5769, paragraphs 38 and 39. 
12  In fact the ECJ initially showed reluctance, since the Charter was seen as merely affirming rights that 
its case-law had already recognized. Interestingly in the Mangold case (Case C 144/04, 2005, ECR 
I-9981), which concerned the principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, the Court recognized 
that  principle  on  the  basis  of  EU  provisions  and  not  on  the  basis  of  the  Charter;  yet  in  the 
Kücükdeveci case (Case C 555/07, judgment of 19 January 2010), on facts preceding the Charter 
but decided after the Lisbon Treaty, the Court relied on Article 21 of the Charter in respect of that 
principle rather than on the basis on which the Mangold judgment was founded: commented on in 
“The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union after Lisbon” by Juliane Kokott and 
Christoph Sobotta, EUI Working Paper, AEL 2010/6. 
13  As to the Charter’s influence over the years, see “La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’ Union 
Européene  dix  ans  après  sa  proclamation”  by  Florence  Benoit-Rohmer,  European  Yearbook  on 
Human Rights, Intersentia, 2011. 
14  [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI. 
15  Judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106. 
16  Judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184. 
17  Judgment of 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II. 
18  [GC], no. 22985/93, ECHR 1998-V. developments going in the same direction. Finally, in connection with the right to 
marry, the Court referred to the Charter and noted in that respect that Article 9, in 
contrast  to  the  corresponding  Article  12  ECHR,  made  no  reference  to  men  and 
women, thus at least attenuating the significance of gender distinction and lending 
support  to  what  the  Court  viewed  as  major  social  changes  in  the  institution  of 
marriage since the adoption of the Convention. Considering that although it should 
not depart from precedents without good reason, yet there would be a risk of barring 
reform or improvement unless a “dynamic and evolutive approach”
19 was maintained. 
The Strasbourg Court has had occasion more recently, after the Treaty of Lisbon,
20 
to refer to Article 9 of the Charter in the case of  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria
21 and to 
examine  it  in  rather  more  detail,  in  the  light  of  the  relevant  explanations 
accompanying  the  Charter.  The  Court  drew  conclusions  from  that  as  to  what  its 
interpretative approach to Article 12 of ECHR should be and what the ramifications 
might be. The case concerned the complaints of a same sex couple, under Article 12 
(right to marry) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of ECHR. Of relevance here is 
only  the  first  complaint.  The  Court,  after  recalling  its  statement  in  the  Christine 
Goodwin case that the institution of marriage had undergone major social changes 
since  the  adoption  of  the  Convention,  pointed  out  that  these  changes  had  to  be 
reconciled with the fact that still only six out of the forty seven Convention States 
allowed same sex marriage. The Court went on to compare the two corresponding 
provisions, i.e. Article 12 ECHR and Article 9 of the Charter, as it had done in the 
case of Christine Goodwin.
22 It noted that the Charter had delibera tely dropped the 
reference to men and women thus confirming that it was meant to be broader in 
scope while, at the same time, the reference to national laws governing the matter 
reflected the diversity that existed in member states and so, arguably, although there 
was no obstacle to recognizing same sex marriage, there was no explicit requirement 
to facilitate such marriage either. The Court’s ratio decidendi is summed up in the 
                                                            
19  Taken from Stafford v. the UK, [GC], no. 46295/99, judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of judgments 
and  Decisions  2002-IV.  The concept  of  “evolutive”,  on  which so much  has been  written,  is  well 
defined  although  not  free  from  controversy;  but  what  are  the  parameters  of  a  “dynamic” 
interpretation?  Is  this  latter  more  connected  with  the  part  of  the  Convention’s  preamble  which 
envisages a “further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms”? See, more generally, 
John  Tobin’s  “Seeking  to  Persuade:  A  Constructive  Approach  to  Human  Rights  Treaty 
Interpretation”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol 23, 2010. 
20  Signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007. 
21  Application no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010. 
22  Article 12 ECHR provides that: “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and 
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right”. Whereas Article 9 
of  the  Charter  provides  that:  “The  right  to  marry  and  to  found  a  family  shall  be  guaranteed  in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”. following passage which, quite clearly, put considerable emphasis on Article 9 of the 
Charter: 
“61. Regard being had to Article 9 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no longer consider 
that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage 
between two persons of the opposite sex. Consequently, it cannot be said that Article 12 is 
inapplicable to the applicant’s complaint. However, as matters stand, the question whether or 
not  to  allow  same-sex  marriage  is  left  to  regulation  by  the  national  law  of  the  Contracting 
State”. 
It consequently  found that there was no violation. I should,  perhaps, explain that 
when in such cases the Strasbourg Court looks at EU law, instruments or texts and 
comments on their import and effect, it does not purport to interpret them. That is not 
its task. The Court’s purpose is to inquire whether it can derive assistance from them 
in interpreting ECHR provisions: see Diallo v. the Czech Republic.
23 However, in so 
far  as  the  Charter  is  concerned,  the  Strasbourg  Court  will,  more  particularly,  be 
comparing the respective provisions in order to ascertain whether the rights depicted 
in the two instruments correspond or whether the Charter provides a more extensive 
protection: Article 52(3). If the latter is the case, the Court will reflect on whether it 
can follow in the same direction through a dynamic and evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention text. 
The  broader  scope  of  the  Charter  compared  to  that  of  the  ECHR,  is  thus  of 
undoubted value to the Strasbourg Court. However, this must be seen in perspective. 
The Court has regard and refers in its judgments to all international law documents 
and texts that may be relevant in the particular case. Still, the comparison with the 
Charter is always of special interest even though the relevant provision may not have 
a direct bearing on the result. I would in this regard mention indicatively Saadi v. the 
UK
24, Salduz v. Turkey,
25 and Scoppola (No.2) v. Italy.
26 This is not to say, however, 
that other EU materials are necessarily of lesser importance. Indeed, where they do 
bear  on  the  matter  in  question  they  are  likely  to  be  especially  significant  for  the 
Strasbourg Court. I would, again indicatively, refer in this regard to the case of D. H. 
and Others v. the Czech Republic,
27 where the Court examined complaints about 
race discrimination. Extensive reference was made there to numerous sources of 
international  law  but  particular  importance  was  attributed  to  Community  Law  and 
Practice. The Court, after pointing out that Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community was an important provision which gave rise to a large number 
of instruments prohibiting discrimination or requiring equal treatment, dealt at length 
                                                            
23  Application no. 20493/07, 23 June 2011. 
24  [GC], no. 13299/03, 29 January 2008. 
25  [GC], no. 36391/02, 27 November 2008. 
26  [GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009. 
27  [GC], no. 57325/00, 13 November 2007. with  two  Council  Directives  made  under  that  Article.  It  cited  a  large  number  of 
judgments of the ECJ and set out relevant passages. 
So what obtains in the EU is invariably of interest to the Strasbourg Court and this 
quite transcends the Charter itself. The Grand Chamber judgment in the case of 
Zolotukhin v. Russia
28  affords a good example. It concerned the  non bis in idem 
principle,  embodied in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR. According to this 
provision, so far as relevant to the present purpose, no one shall be liable to be tried 
or punished again for the same offence. What is key is the word “offence”. Article 50 
of the Charter is in this respect similarly phrased;
29 and so too is Article 14(7) of the 
United  Nations  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  But  Article  54  of  the 
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (CISA), which 
contains a  prohibition  embodying  that  principle,  relates  to  the  same  “facts”  not 
“offence”; and a like approach is taken in Article 20 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which refers to the same “conduct” this being, essentially, equivalent 
to  the  same  “facts”.  The  case-law  of  the  Strasbourg  Court  on  this  matter,  which 
spanned  a  considerable  period  of  time,  lacked  consistency  in  the  interpretative 
approach  to  the meaning  of the  notion  of  “offence”  in  the  context  of Article  4  of 
Protocol No 7. In one line of cases the Court focused on the “same conduct”;
30 in 
another it laid emphasis on how such conduct might be classified, thus justifying 
more than one charge;
31 and then in a third, in order to lessen the impact of the 
classification  test  which  consider ably  weakened  the  protection  afforded  by  that 
provision, it introduced “the essential elements” qualification, which aimed at avoiding 
a  subsequent  prosecution  for  offences  that  were  only  “nominally  different”.
32  I 
appreciate that these differences may not be readily understood without a detailed 
analysis  of  the  case-law;  it  is  nonetheless  easy  to  realize  that  there  was  a  real 
problem  to  be  solved.  The  Court  in  Zolotukhin  decided  to  remove  the  existing 
uncertainty which, as it rightly recognized, was incompatible with such a fundamental 
right.  The  solution  it  chose  took  into  account  the  ECJ  case-law:  Limburgse,
33 
Portland,
34 Esbroeck
35 and Kraaijenbrink
36 which discussed the principle in various 
                                                            
28  [GC], no. 14939/03, 10 February 2009. 
29  While, however, the Charter prohibition applies to the whole of the EU area as one space, that of the 
ECHR applies only within the specific jurisdiction of a member State. 
30  Exemplified in Gradinger v. Austria, Judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-C. 
31  See indicatively Oliveira v. Switzerland, no. 25711/94, Judgment of 30 July 1998, ECHR 1998-V. 
32  Introduced  by  Franz  Fischer  v.  Austria,  no.  37950/97,  Judgment  of  29  May  2001,  frequently 
followed. 
33  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) and others v. Commission, C-238/99 P and others, 15 
October 2002. 
34  Portland and others v. Commission, C-204/00 P and others, 7 January 2004. 
35  Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck, C-436/04, 9 March 2006. 
36  Norma Kraaijenbrink, C-367/05, 18 July 2007. contexts,  including  that  of  CISA,  in  respect  of  which  the  ECJ  said  that  the  real 
criterion consisted of “an identity of the material acts understood as the existence of 
a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together”. This fact-
based criterion explained in effect how to determine whether the facts are the same; 
and it obviously differed from the criterion which turned on whether on one view or 
another the facts constituted the same “offence”, which is the word used both in the 
Charter and the ECHR as the basis for the prohibition. The Strasbourg Court, after 
carrying out an exhaustive review, streamlined itself with this ECJ interpretation – 
which,  let  it  be  noted,  is  not free from  controversy  that  relates  to  distinctions  on 
subject matter – and settled for the “same facts” (meaning also “the same acts”) 
interpretation. It reasoned this by saying that Article 4 of Protocol No 7 “must be 
understood as prohibiting the prosecution of or trial of a second offence in so far as it 
arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same”. At the end of 
the day what is crucial is that the principle in question, however worded, should be 
interpreted in a uniform way. 
More recently, in the case of Bayatyan v. Armenia,
37 where the question was whether 
conscientious objection to military service should   be recognized as a right, the 
Charter, which by that time had acquired binding effect in the EU, proved particularly 
useful to the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court. It was taken to confirm a 
broader change internationally and, more particularly, in E urope. The Chamber had 
followed well established case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights, 
according to which Article 9 (on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion), when viewed in the light of Article 4 § 3(b) (on the prohibition of slavery and 
forced labour) which does not regard military service as forced or compulsory labour, 
did not encompass a right to conscientious objection. The Grand Chamber took a 
different view. It observed that since 1993 the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights had considered that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
did give rise to such a right; that in fact an overwhelming majority of Council of 
Europe States had already recognized this right, which meant that there was general 
consensus in Europe; that there was also consensus further afield; and that the right 
was explicitly recognized by paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Charter. The Grand 
Chamber said that:
38 
“Such explicit addition is no doubt deliberate…and reflects the unanimous recognition of the 
right to conscientious objection by the member States of the European Union, as well as the 
weight attached to that right in modern European society”. 
                                                            
37  [GC], no. 23459/03, 7 July 2011. 
38  At paragraph 106. I  should  not,  perhaps,  conclude  this  selection  of  cases  which  illustrate  how  the 
Charter has been used by the Strasbourg Court, both before and after having been 
given legal effect, without adverting even very briefly to Article 47, which is analogous 
but apparently wider in scope than Article 6 ECHR. In two cases the Strasbourg 
Court was encouraged to reconsider, in the light of the Charter provision, the ambit of 
Article 6 § 1 and to expand its field of application. The first case, Vilho Eskelinen and 
Others  v.  Finland,
39  considerably  extended  the  applicability  of  Article  6  §  1  to 
employment in the civil service, thus increasing access to court. In fact Article 47 of 
the Charter reflected in this regard the broad scope of judicial control, as already 
fixed  in  Community  Law  by  the  ECJ  judgment  in  Marguerite  Johnston  v.  Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
40 However it is difficult to say whether, 
without prompting from the Charter, the Strasbourg Court would have delved into 
Community law to the extent that it did or would have felt equally comfortable with the 
conclusion that it reached.
41  
The  second  case  was  Micallef  v.  Malta.
42  It  had  previously  been  held  by  the 
Strasbourg  Court  that  interim  measures  in  judicial  proceedings  did  not  fall  within 
Article 6 § 1. This was because of the view that they did not amount to disputes 
about civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge. In Micallef, which had been 
examined  by  the  domestic  courts  in  connection  with  an  interlocutory  matter,  the 
Strasbourg Court noted that a consensus in favour of applicability had developed 
amongst Council of Europe States; that Community case-law was to the same effect; 
and that this was reflected in Article 47 of the Charter. 
It is clear that the Charter has encouraged the Strasbourg Court to interpret protected 
rights  through  the  prism  of  a  newer  understanding.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be 
remembered that the ECJ had, from quite early on, in the case of Rutili
43 in 1975, 
recognized the special significance of the ECHR itself, as part of the sources from 
which the general principles of Community law were to be derived, in other words, 
identified and expounded. In time this relationship was fortified and formalized by 
Article 6(2) - now 6(3) - TEU which provided that fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the ECHR, constitute part of the EU as general principles of law. In addition, 
Article 52(3) of the Charter provides, in furtherance of the principle of homogeneity, 
that the meaning and scope of rights in the Charter are the same as those of the 
                                                            
39  [GC], no. 63235/00, 19 April 2007. 
40  Case 222/84, 1986, ECR 1651. 
41  The Strasbourg Court had previously, looking at Community law, made an important step forward in 
Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, (§66), ECHR 1999-VIII; but the case of Marguerite Johnston, 
which considerably pre-dated it, had no impact until the Charter came along. 
42  [GC], no. 17056/06, 15 October 2009. 
43  See supra at note 5. corresponding ECHR rights. The contribution of the ECHR has indisputably been 
substantial. And it should be noted that it is not just the Convention text which is 
taken into account by the Luxembourg Court. It is, more importantly, the Strasbourg 
case-law which gives life to the text. We are reminded of the Strasbourg contribution 
by former ECJ Advocate-General Jacobs, in the following passage:
44 
“The ECJ has treated what is perhaps the most fundamental treaty in Europe, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as if it were binding upon the Community, and has followed 
scrupulously the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, even though the European 
Union itself is not a party to the Convention.” 
In fact the two systems, the ECHR and the Community - now the EU - have been 
beneficially interacting through their respective Courts which, over the years, have 
been sensitive and receptive to human rights developments. They have established, 
through mutual respect, a truly harmonious relationship as the necessary means for 
achieving  coherence  in  the  protection  of  human  rights.  The  ECtHR  judgment  in 
M.S.S.  v.  Belgium  and  Greece,
45  followed  later  in  the  same  year  by  the  CJEU 
judgment  in  N.S.  v.  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  and  M.E.  and 
Others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform,
46 is yet another illustration of the common direction of the two courts. 
But the full process will only be completed upon accession of the EU to the ECHR.
47 
As the present President of the Court has recently put it in a keynote addr ess at the 
University of Surrey, the Charter and accession are complementary measures.
48 
Apart from the direct influence that the Charter has initially had as a Community text 
and, subsequently, during almost three years now as part of EU primary law, there  
has been another less conspicuous but significant effect, of interest not only to the 
EU but to the Convention system as well. You will recall that soon after the Charter 
was proclaimed, the Commission decided - that was in March 2001 - to subject every 
proposed act to a prior check of conformity with the Charter, resulting in a declaration 
of compatibility which would be appended and that, to this end, an appropriate 
mechanism was put in place. You will also recall that in 2005 it was sought to make 
                                                            
44  Francis  G.  Jacobs,  The  Sovereignty  of  Law,  Cambridge  University  Press,  2007,  p.  54;  cited  by 
Johan  Callewaert,  Deputy  Registrar  of  the  Grand  Chamber  of  the  ECtHR  in  his  article  “The 
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45  [GC], no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
46  Judgment of 21 December 2011 in joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10. 
47  The following articles, the one just before the Lisbon Treaty and the other a little after, are illustrative 
of an ongoing debate on the matter: Tobias Lock, “The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship 
between the Two European Courts”, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 
Vol. 8, 2009, pp. 375-398; and Zdzislaw Kedzia, “Relationship Between the European Convention on 
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48  “A  Europe  of  Rights:  the  European  Union  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights”,  Keynote 
Address by Judge Dean Spielman, University of Surrey School of Law Workshop, 8 June 2012. this legality control more effective by providing that due reasoning be given so as to 
make compatibility easily apparent. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has 
been  implementing  an  updated  strategy  that  takes  account  of  the  new  legal 
environment.
49 
Prior control procedure has become possible or, at least, substantially facilitated by 
reason of the fact that the Charter has made a broad spectrum of rights, albeit 
already recognized, both visible and tangible and, therefore, accessible for use as a 
practical yardstick at an early stage in the legislative process. The most effective 
vindication of rights is that which occurs before rights have been infringed. Human 
rights should be secured at source. A judicial finding of an infringement is always 
only second best. 
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